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1. The world must be made from elements because it is devidable and elements are not, and that which is not pure cometh from that which is;
and that which is dividable must be made from that which is not dividable, for Helium may not be made with Helium, for Helium previously existed, so the world must be derived,
so that which it is derived from remains, and hold as staple to it's character a substance of it's own, such that it may not really be made of anything in common with an element, but rather, as has been said,
is derived from them, as the circumstance of their coming into order with one another, such that it is dividable, and elements are not, and must bear it's distinct character, of division wherefor elements do not, so that it must be isolated from the elements,
and they must entertain a different degree of being, as those atoms which make of Helium entail a different sort of existence then Helium.
2. So the world is separate from the Elements that it is created from; it is derived as a circumstance of the order of elements(Heraclitus, all is fire) for the elements must remain elemental at all times and the world is not elemental, it is dividable.
3 The world or a worldly thing is the circumstance of elements in a particular order.
4 A law is something that causes circumstance in the world.
5 A law is certain elements in an order.
6 The world is divisable as has been show in 1.
7 The laws that it is created from, and not the elements it has nothing to do with, must conserve there effects amongst themselves if the world is to be dividable; such that any possible effect of a law is conserved as part of the effect of another possible law, such that if the world is figured without one law, another law causes it's effect in such a way as part of that effect entails the complete property of the other law.
8 Such that if Water is taken away, Ice insures it's effect as part of it's own, for if there is ice there can be water, and if Ice, then tundra, and tundra in the climate and in the air, and the air in that which people must breathe in order to live, so that if people must breathe then air must exist. etc.
9 Such that there exists a law wherein the possible effect of every other law is conserved as a partition of it's own effect, which is the effect of every possible effect of every possible law as a whole, which is beyond both the designations of elements and the world, as the world is any possible effects of any possibly ordered elements, and if the One Law is all possible effects of law in the world plus the effect of all of these as a whole, it is also beyond the scope of the elements in orders that define those laws which cause effects in the world, such that no order of elements can describe the One Law to the World who's effect is the order of all possible elements plus this effect as a whole beyond those orders and elements.
10 The One Transcendent Law is the complete nature of law.
11 the complete nature of law is an antecedence of elemental order, elements, and the world.
12 The complete nature of law functions beyond the capacities of elemental designations to contemplate, and therefor beyond that which the world can necessarily consist of. The Nature of Law will be called God (if)
13 God is that which creates the world outside the world,
15 The One creates the world, consciously or not, outside the world
16 so that the one is God.
Example
The effects of elemental order may be substracted from the world(all elemental order) if other elemental orders conserve the effects of the subtracted effects as parts of their own so that, no matter the quantity of subverted effects, the world retains its character, of being the summation of all the effects of elemental order, and also upholds the Seminal Law, that it must be dividable, wherefor elements are not.
So that one order of elements exists which contains as a part of it's own effect all the effects of elemental orders intheworld, which is the effects of all elemental order, such that this particular order of elements is beyond the capacity of which elements may describe to the world circumstances of itself, so no order of elements exists to satiate this One Law which necessarily must exist, such that the One Law is transcendental.
So law informs the world as a circumstance of elements in order.
Suppose there are 3 laws in the world.
1 is a part of 2 and 3.
2 is a part of 3.
4 contains as part of itself the last order, 3, for it cannot contain only 3, the final order, or it would be the order of 3.
The effect of 4 does not exist in the world.
The world is all the effects of elemental order.
4 transcends the world for the world cannot be informed of 4.
CONCLUSIONS
The world exists as the possibility of all orders of elements because
the world is all of the elements that are in order, and if an element
exists, it could be put into order, thereby constituting itself in the
world
(for) when an element becomes ordered it joins the world
(therefor) the world is all orders of elements(all elements in order).
It must always be all the orders of elements, and it must also be
dividable into a more insignificant number of orders of elements, for
elements are dividable and the world is not, as those elements which
produce order beyond degeneration, always existing, always exersising
order; always are participating in the world
(so) one order of elements must conserve as a part of itself another
order of elements, so the world can be figured without one order of
elements(be divided from it) and yet retain it's essential property as
being that which all elements are ordered into.
So philosophy is that which dissects the world; or reveals the
genotypic anatomy to it.
Philosophy may hereby create it's own world in the Mind of Men, a world
of reason, wherewith the imagination hath so disposed a more originary
world to imitations, which we call the assumption of axioms or the
induction of calculus; in an effort to compel the world into a smaller
more portion of itself, to draw from this smaller world in relation to
a larger, as that which they created afterwhich that which they hath
created from, in the order that their understanding of the world as a
whole may be furthered, though, as has been shown, the degree to which
a particular law, or order of elements, provides a contemplation of
something in the world, must conserve those effects which are simpler
then it, such that the degree to which one order of elements effects
the world is contained as part of the effect to another, such that,
every order of elements, or law, is contained as a part of another law,
so that the world, being made of elements in order, is conserved by
each order of it's elements, in that they entail other and simpler
orders as parts of themselves, so that their is certainly a final
order, that conserves as a part of itself all those orders with which
the world is made, including itself, such that if there are laws A, B,
C, and D; A is concerved by B,C, and D; B by C and D; C by D, and what
of D? Where is the law that conserves the final law within nature? For
if this law is expunged from the body of creation, all of creation
would collapse, such that the world would, under devision, fail to
comply with it's own characteristic self, that it is the summation of
all elemental order, if this final order of elements is removed from
the world and no other order conserves it, it is an order of elements
existing outside the world which is all the orders of elements and
thereby cannot be. Therefor there must be a One Law that conserves as a
part of itself all the laws within nature, such that, it is every order
within nature as a whole, and thereof, is beyond those capacities of
elemental contemplations. The One Law cannot, by any order of elements,
become a part of the world, such that, [the world is all the orders of
elements except for the order of elements that conserves all the orders
of elements in the world as a part of itself].
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it's too long, can you summerise it shorter cos i can highlight it and get the computer to read it to me but it's kind of like a robot voice, it's difficult to understand. I'm lazy to read it, i just want to know by hearing it rather than reading it, it's better marketing.
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Hmmmmmm.... I'm just wondering...
maybe we needed to work that hard and fight each other to realize that what ever is on this planet is a part of everything else, the law of nature has been tampered with, i suppose it is about discovering what is positive and what is negative within all of that.
I do not believe birth control pills are very good for you at all, however if we have too many babies then where is everyone going to live ? I'm not quite sure about it, i think it is wrong to block your natural body process as we don't really know how it can rebound.
Controlling things too much for sure can make big problems, if you look at nature, no two flower are exactly the same, everything seems to have its own flow and way of connecting to its environment, if every flower was the same colour we would be deprived of so much.
My cat is stuck in this city house deprived of grass and trees, it's not really right or fair on animals to control them in that way, just as it is not right to stop a child from playing, it is natural and all the natural things don't really have to be evaluated or worked out because they have their way of being a part of the world.
The question is how should we intervene when a child is being bullied or treated badly by it parents etc; such negative things pass down a ripple line, it's always been a big struggle how to keep peace without restraining peoples freedom.
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ON THE DISCRETION OF MODEL THEORY,
AN INCLUSION OF NEW MODELS.
Let L be a language. Let L contain abstractions, logical and non logical symbols, and a grammar whereupon the syntaxis in logical and non logical symbols are a metalanguage or a sort of informal set theory and, as will later be noted, provide a secondary metalanguage, that is to be later discussed, and labeled with (e). Let (A), an abstraction be any [category] of [subjects] or that dedition of all the indices of partitions of free variables expected by those subjects, such that an abstraction may suggest a taxonomy amongst those partitions of free variables as a subject and as a sort of natural course that those hiarchies of partitions are factored by(See Rectus Causa) as to assume effigurate wholes called subjects. Let a subject be that nomination of certain partitions or free variables AS,
as those partitions in the subject that are a subgroup to the abstraction as a category, or may be isometrically located to a subgroup within the abstraction, that is a category of all subjections, and that which contains all possible subjects as AS. Let an L-structure contain partitions or free variables that are interpreted by a grammar on logical
and non logical operators that will be called a [circumstance] of those partitions or free variables in the L-structure. Let a subject be a free variable on an L-structure as an encoding of taxonomy of some other free variables obtained by the instrumentality of the category of subjects in A so that we let a subject be which some of who's partitions are found in Asymptotic knowledge, and let all the partitions of free variables in a subject be Symplectic knowledge.
Let a set M of L that is a referrent to the L-Structure of a parenthetical isomorphism of the partitions to that structure contain those free variables in either of the two states:
relavence or irrelavence(R, r). Let r equal the sum of those partitions or free variables of the set M on an L-structure that are not obtained by the subject of the category AS. Let R contain all the partitions
on M as a referrent to an L-structure that are common to S or the subject and otherwise are a subgroup of that subject. Let R be called Asymptotic knowledge; let a subject be called Symplectic knowledge. Let a circumstance, or that circumstance of the subject, C, contain inference rules or the syntactical or set theoretic framework
whereby may or may not be provided for those operations on Mn(Rn) or Mn(rn) or with that Asymptotic knowledge, that is Mn(Rn), or in another set of words, let a circumstance(s) of the relavent kind and only the relavent kind give an account of the metalanguage as it only may implicitly colligate a given subject, such that an ectrotic language may be defined as that language which is most rudimentary and is any metametalanguage on a metalanguage of set theoretic and syntactical frameworks that compartmentalizes a subject S on A to itself in a cirumstance and as a self sufficient and recursive formalization or isomorphism of the definite syntax involved in creating the circumstance amongst some R-variables and is a sort of atomic proposition explaining the circumstance of a predication of S on A in a recursive miniaturization of L structural grammar or inference as for being oriented with the objectlanguage. Let an ectrotic language be a set of free variables, each one, representing a particular and informal circumstance or state of operators on some R variables on a definite subject. Let the circumstance or the inclusion of operators on an Asymptotic knowledge be a relavent predication to a subject. Let a well formed theory exclude all possible r in M in AS. An irrelavent predication cannot relate to a subject in order to predicate that subject, and, therefor, is to be hereafter called The Fallacy Of Irrelavent Predications.
Let any relavent circumstance be that instance whereupon Asymptotic partitions as operated on by their metalanguages, grammar, or syntax, do not violate any propositions of axioms, and will be called Well Behaved if and only if they do not neglect any contingency of their axioms, so that circumstance of Asymptotic partitions, as that is a subgroup to Symplectic partitions, may always be expressed by the subject without incurring the violation of any propositions of axioms, so that a natural sort of harmony may be devised to comparing these sorts of partitions, and what is so in one, in another, so that the truth is that relavent circumstance which does not violate any given propositions of axioms so that whatsoever is operated within the Asymptotic partition may be done so on the subject, given any the same L, thus expanding the category to include implications from the predicate amongst it's subject. So that any (e) variable can be included by the subject it is oriented with, so that, whatever may be implied by the (e) vatriable may (always) be implied by that subject.
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ON THE DISCRETION OF MODEL THEORY,
AN INCLUSION OF NEW MODELS.
Let L be a language. Let L contain abstractions, logical and non logical symbols, and a grammar whereupon the syntaxis in logical and non logical symbols are a metalanguage or a sort of informal set theory and, as will later be noted, provide a secondary metalanguage, that is to be later discussed, and labeled with (e). Let (A), an abstraction be any [category] of [subjects] or that dedition of all the indices of partitions of free variables expected by those subjects, such that an abstraction may suggest a taxonomy amongst those partitions of free variables as a subject and as a sort of natural course that those hiarchies of partitions are factored by(See Rectus Causa) as to assume effigurate wholes called subjects. Let a subject be that nomination of certain partitions or free variables AS,
as those partitions in the subject that are a subgroup to the abstraction as a category, or may be isometrically located to a subgroup within the abstraction, that is a category of all subjections, and that which contains all possible subjects as AS. Let an L-structure contain partitions or free variables that are interpreted by a grammar on logical
and non logical operators that will be called a [circumstance] of those partitions or free variables in the L-structure. Let a subject be a free variable on an L-structure as an encoding of taxonomy of some other free variables obtained by the instrumentality of the category of subjects in A so that we let a subject be which some of who's partitions are found in Asymptotic knowledge, and let all the partitions of free variables in a subject be Symplectic knowledge.
Let a set M of L that is a referrent to the L-Structure of a parenthetical isomorphism of the partitions to that structure contain those free variables in either of the two states:
relavence or irrelavence(R, r). Let r equal the sum of those partitions or free variables of the set M on an L-structure that are not obtained by the subject of the category AS. Let R contain all the partitions
on M as a referrent to an L-structure that are common to S or the subject and otherwise are a subgroup of that subject. Let R be called Asymptotic knowledge; let a subject be called Symplectic knowledge. Let a circumstance, or that circumstance of the subject, C, contain inference rules or the syntactical or set theoretic framework
whereby may or may not be provided for those operations on Mn(Rn) or Mn(rn) or with that Asymptotic knowledge, that is Mn(Rn), or in another set of words, let a circumstance(s) of the relavent kind and only the relavent kind give an account of the metalanguage as it only may implicitly colligate a given subject, such that an ectrotic language may be defined as that language which is most rudimentary and is any metametalanguage on a metalanguage of set theoretic and syntactical frameworks that compartmentalizes a subject S on A to itself in a cirumstance and as a self sufficient and recursive formalization or isomorphism of the definite syntax involved in creating the circumstance amongst some R-variables and is a sort of atomic proposition explaining the circumstance of a predication of S on A in a recursive miniaturization of L structural grammar or inference as for being oriented with the objectlanguage. Let an ectrotic language be a set of free variables, each one, representing a particular and informal circumstance or state of operators on some R variables on a definite subject. Let the circumstance or the inclusion of operators on an Asymptotic knowledge be a relavent predication to a subject. Let a well formed theory exclude all possible r in M in AS. An irrelavent predication cannot relate to a subject in order to predicate that subject, and, therefor, is to be hereafter called The Fallacy Of Irrelavent Predications.
Let any relavent circumstance be that instance whereupon Asymptotic partitions as operated on by their metalanguages, grammar, or syntax, do not violate any propositions of axioms, and will be called Well Behaved if and only if they do not neglect any contingency of their axioms, so that circumstance of Asymptotic partitions, as that is a subgroup to Symplectic partitions, may always be expressed by the subject without incurring the violation of any propositions of axioms, so that a natural sort of harmony may be devised to comparing these sorts of partitions, and what is so in one, in another, so that the truth is that relavent circumstance which does not violate any given propositions of axioms so that whatsoever is operated within the Asymptotic partition may be done so on the subject, given any the same L, thus expanding the category to include implications from the predicate amongst it's subject. So that any (e) variable can be included by the subject it is oriented with, so that, whatever may be implied by the (e) variable may (always) be implied by that subject.
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